The difference between virtues and skills has a long history in ethics. This history is confused, frustrating and, I will argue, generally harmful to human flourishing in the West. It engendered a form of elitism which for centuries systematically excluded certain groups of people from being models of human virtue. I will argue in this paper that the central problem is a conflation of the skillvirtue distinction with differences in lifestyles. Originating in the class structure of the Athenian polis, this confusion continues today and is a major drawback of current virtue theory.
Aristotle distinguishes techne or craft-knowledge from phronesis (1140a-1140b25).
1 Techne is concerned with production. The end is given and the problem is how to produce it. Phronesis or practical wisdom deliberates about ends themselves with human flourishing as the goal. Crafts or skills can be used in a virtuous or vicious way and their use is contingent on the degree of phronesis the agent brings to the act. Thus excellent bricklaying can be done for ends which are destructive to human flourishing (concentration camp) or conducive to it (university building). Excellence in bricklaying is to be very good in a skill; excellence in practical wisdom is human excellence or virtue. Aristotle concludes, 'Clearly, then, phronesis is a virtue, not (a form of) craft knowledge. ' (1140b25) .
This basic distinction is echoed by modern virtue theorists. Wallace puts it this way. Skills concerned with production may or may not be worth having for an individual.
2 For example, excellence in debating requires a certain skill; debating can be done more or less well. But it may not be a skill everyone wants or needs. On the other hand, we do not call a trait a virtue unless we think it is worth having as a human being. Wallace argues that the best explanation for this difference is that virtues (such as courage) are human excellences whereas skills (like debating) are not. As Wallace notes, both skills and virtues may require difficult and complex learning.
1 All quotations from Aristotle are taken from Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis, In: Hackett, 1985 Hitting a fastball or doing eye surgery are complex and admirable skills because of their difficulty; rolling around a large boulder is less impressive.
3 Becoming courageous or temperate may also involve difficult and complex learning. But the result of practicing a virtue is an excellence in human flourishing that governs, so to speak, what skills should be learned and when they should be used.
Maclntyre's point of distinguishing bricklaying from architecture is not to distinguish skills from virtues per se, but to distinguish two types of human action, one of which is crucial to identifying the full meaning of virtue. He specifically notes that virtues can be exercised in arenas other than what he calls a 'practice'. 4 Nevertheless, he clearly defines virtue by relating the concept to practices and specifically contrasts practices with technical skills.
5
Practices like architecture light up central features of virtue in ways that actions like bricklaying do not. This distinction is clearly grounded in the skill-virtue dichotomy. Bricklaying, throwing a football and planting turnips are practical means to an end, a function of production. Likewise, the game of tic-tac-toe, which Maclntyre would also exclude from being a practice, is also a simple skill with a clear end. The game of chess is a practice; tic-tac-toe is not.
6
This dichotomy is artificial and Maclntyre's definition of a practice continues a form of intellectual bias in which more intelligent or educated or 'higher class' humans can represent virtue more fully as a model than those whose lives are dedicated to skills. In Aristotle's day the aristocrat best modeled virtue; the potter did not. Today architects can best model virtue; bricklayers cannot.
Though Aristotle's analysis of virtue is an attempt to rid ethics of other-worldly Forms, the Platonic influence on him is clear and bears full fruit in Book Ten where the man of contemplation represents the highest model of virtue (1177al0-1179a32). Here he argues that other lifestyles besides contemplation and study are not as innately fulfilling because they are less self-sufficient, less godlike, and above all less related to the essence of being human. This tendency is also present in Aristotle's clear admiration for the megalopsuchos, the 'great soul' who embodies what honor is about (1123a34-1125al6 , 191, 193-194. 6 Ibid., 187-188.
lifestyles, some of which model virtue better than others. This confusion permeates the Nicomachean Ethics. Part of it is related to Aristotle's bad biology about who is innately capable of a fully developed psyche. But, aside from that, those whose lives are dedicated to skills cannot in principle be full models of virtue because the majority of their time is dedicated to achieving practical ends. Those whose lives are dedicated to the intellectual deliberation of ends themselves, i.e., Athenian aristocrats, have the time and potential for a full blossoming of virtue. To his credit Wallace avoids this problem by contrasting traits designed to produce certain ends with traits desirable for all humans to have regardless of profession, education or intelligence level. This is a useful way around the lifestyle issue because the desirability of honesty as a character trait, for example, is independent of any particular activity. Nothing in Wallace's definition precludes tic-tac-toe from exhibiting honesty as much as football or chess. Virtues are different from skills but are applicable to them, the relevant virtues being specified by the skill being performed. Maclntyre, however, reverts to defining virtue by reference to certain types of activities. And, in a move that even Aristotle does not overtly make, he openly contrasts practices conducive to virtue with skills. Only practices can fully exhibit virtue. Thus bricklayers as bricklayers may be virtuous but cannot be models of what virtue entails. In attacking this dichotomy I will argue that skills and simple games, specifically the ones Maclntyre mentions, do in fact have all the identifiers for full virtue which he argues for. They also are capable of exhibiting all the failures of vice.
Bricklaying and other skills are supposedly excluded from being practices by the way in which Maclntyre defines the term.
By "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. 7 Now let's look at bricklaying relative to this definition. It is certainly a coherent socially established cooperative activity. Is it complex? What does this mean? Architecture is more complex than bricklaying but bricklaying is more complex than punching an assembly line button all day. In fact, the distinction in our culture between skilled 'Ibid., 187.
labour like bricklaying and unskilled labour like assembly line work has a great deal to do with complexity. There are a number of factors that go into construction and materials management that are in the province of the bricklayer himself. Experience with types of materials and types of designs are essential to doing the job well. So, if complexity is the issue, it is not clear why the line is drawn above bricklaying rather than above totally robotic-type work. Moreover, complexity as a defining factor of a practice appears to be an unfounded bias in favor of those with well-developed psyches. Tic-tac-toe is not complex to most people; American football supposedly is. But to a Down's Syndrome child tic-tac-toe may represent an enormous challenge in complexity. Now are we saying that tic-tac-toe is not really complex because it is not complex to those with normal intelligence? This is odd in that there are games that math geniuses find easy but most 'normal' adults find incredibly difficult and complex. Are these games really complex? Not to the math genius who, on the other hand, may find a game of social interaction incomprehensible while someone with a far lesser IQ may be quite at ease with it. My point is that this term may have much less clout than Maclntyre intends. His cut-off point is largely arbitrary and biased toward a certain intellectual level, that of the 'educated' citizen. If this is crucial to defining virtue, then many humans are ipso facto less capable of full virtue.
The next section of Maclntyre's definition is crucial. Are there goods internal to bricklaying which can be realized in the course of trying to achieve a level of excellence appropriate to and definitive of the activity? The distinction between internal and external goods and their relationship to virtue is one of Maclntyre's most original contributions to virtue ethics. In his now familiar example, the practice of chess has many internal goods-the stretching of the mind, the thrill of competition, the aesthetic and logical beauty of the game itself-but it also can have external goods-trophies, money, status. External goods can be achieved without acting virtuously but acting virtuously is a necessary condition to achieve the internal goods.
8 This holds across practices. Plagiarism may satisfy external requirements but the joys of creative writing are not among them.
Bricklaying can be done more or less well. Standards of excellence exist which are appropriate to the skill and which help define what quality means in that type of work. Excellence in construction is actually a joint endeavor of many people from architects to bricklayers. Sloppy brick work is recognized as poor by those knowledgeable in the skill and advertising as a 'bricklayer' entails a stan-8 Ibid., 188.
dard of excellence that partially defines the skill. But does bricklaying have internal goods? Do skills in general have them? Clearly yes. A deep sense of satisfaction can be obtained by doing a craft or skill well. Doing a skill involves concentration and often close coordination of eye and hand. Depending on the particular job, bricklaying or other skilled labor can be a genuine mental challenge also. Aesthetic qualities can go into excellence in construction, not just into the architect's blueprint. None of these can be achieved without virtues such as self-discipline and honesty. It does not appear, however, that some of Maclntyre's other examples such as tic-tac-toe or planting turnips have internal goods. But this again demonstrates the intellectual bias of traditional virtue theory. The quality of the act-planting turnips-depends totally on the situation and the mental capacity or attitude of the agent. Soil conditions, weather conditions, quality of the seed-a number of factors may go into doing the act well or poorly. Now if 'turnip planting' is conceived strictly as a mindless routine, i.e., if the human agent is equivalent to a robot with no judgement allowed in the activity-then Maclntyre is right. It is no practice. But the act is not prima facie robotic work. Humans who are not forced by physical or economic servitude into activities like planting crops almost always view the activity as part of a larger good that can be done more or less well. There actually are degrees of excellence involved in planting crops. The act itself is certainly not an example of a 'non-practice.' It may be but more likely there are far more factors that go into working a field and planting crops well than are imagined by university professors.
The tic-tac-toe example also illustrates the intellectual bias about internal goods. Playing tic-tac-toe has no internal goods to most adults. But it does to a child. In fact, it could be a significant way to teach children about the internal-external good distinction. To a child or to someone with limited intellectual ability, tic-tac-toe may be as challenging as chess is to a normal adult. Doing it well after deciphering possible moves may bring a great sense of satisfaction, may stretch the individual's mind and may have strong aesthetic appeal. Now why would we draw a line and say that tic-tac-toe is not a practice, thereby eliminating the possibility of internal goods and making it ineligible as a vehicle for defining virtue? Why does the honesty of a 6-year-old who desperately wants to win tic-tac-toe not count while the honesty of a master chess player does? Clearly there are gradations of difficulty in the activity but there is no boundary that exists between games that are relevant to virtue and those that aren't. Honesty is honesty. The line is drawn pure and simple out of a tradition of intellectual bias.
The last part of Maclntyre's definition is that working for excellence in a practice results in the systematic extension of human powers to achieve excellence and extends our conception of the ends and goods involved in doing that. In other words, acting virtuously to achieve excellence in the practice extends our limits of excellence in the practice itself (e.g., new, creative forms of music), increases our comprehension of what is involved in the practice, and, beyond that, has a 'ripple' effect on other areas of human life. As Aristotle might say, we get in the habit of working for excellence and, given the relationship of excellence and virtue, we develop habits of virtue.
Do skills like bricklaying or simple games like tic-tac-toe fit here? Excellence in a skill evolves both for the individual and for the skill itself. The concept of the apprentice-master relationship which has been part of most human societies embodies the point that pursuing excellence extends the individual's powers to achieve excellence and extends the individual's conception of the ends and goods involved in doing that. As Maclntyre notes, when a person enters a practice seriously, he or she implicitly accepts the authority of the standards of that practice and the inadequacy of his or her novice performance relative to them.
9 He cites listening to Bartok's last quartets; he could equally cite the apprentice bricklayer extending his powers of understanding materials, techniques and aesthetic qualities by submitting to the standards embodied by the master. Moreover, the boundaries of skills themselves can be extended by those who pursue excellence in them. It might be through better technique or better materials. In house painting it may be a way of applying a new paint, for example, that brings out the beauty of the color more distinctly. This can filter into the tradition of the skill and modify the tradition itself. Once again, if the skill is defined as robotic work, this is not true. Then only those who 'know' will be able to extend the skill's boundaries-the architect or materials chemist. Skills, however, are in fact practices.
The same is true for a simple game. It is clearly possible for an individual (child or developmentally disabled) to extend her own powers to achieve excellence through such a game. But Maclntyre talks about 'systematically' extending those powers. What does this mean? It cannot be rational analysis since those who work in advanced practices like science often advance their own powers and the scope of the practice by hunches or serendipity or simply noticing something different. A game like football, which he does count as a practice, extends people's powers to achieve excellence in a number of ways, one of which is simply finding ways to survive on 9 Ibid., 190.
the field. I suspect Maclntyre's point is that the activity is part of a well-organized system. The tradition of astronomy, for example, is enriched in a systematic way by new advances, and excellence in that practice advances both the agent's creative powers and those of other practitioners because they are part of the organized system of astronomy. This would appear to eliminate something like tic-tactoe (but not bricklaying). But where does Maclntyre want to draw the line between what can be 'systematically' advanced and what cannot? Do a large number of people have to be involved? It appears not. A computer game invented and played well by ten people (and only those ten) can systematically advance excellence both for the players (inside and outside the game) and in the improvement of the game itself. Perhaps only more complicated activities well-established within some social tradition can be systematically advanced. So the superb figure skater extends the boundaries of excellence in her sport and the brilliant astronomer pushes forward her field because these organized and complex activities are well-embedded in a social network. Excellence in playing tic-tac-toe does not extend the boundaries of excellence in the game because the boundaries are hard and fast and the game is not embedded in any organized social tradition. But, as alluded to earlier, these 'facts' about tic-tac-toe are only true for those of us who are intellectually at a certain level. To a group of children or developmentally disabled, an excellent play in a simple game pushes forward the level of excellence in the game itself and for all practitioners. Children also frequently form traditions around simple games and these traditions can be enhanced by shrewd players. Not only that, excellence might actually serve to creatively improve upon the rules of the game itself (as many children have done with simple games). To us a game like tic-tac-toe is just a series of a few simple moves with some players getting to the goal quicker than others. But so is football. Excellence is, among other things, a function of where we start.
No reason thus exists why virtue cannot be as fully modelled in bricklaying, planting turnips or tic-tac-toe as in football, farming or architecture. All intentional voluntary human activities can be done more or less well. To do them well requires virtue. Conversely, all such activities, simple or complex, can be done viciously. Architecture may become a routine, a boring grind with no concern for internal goods. So can bricklaying when the skill ceases to be of importance to the agent. Maclntyre points out that practices are corrupted by vice.
10 When the architect no longer cares about excel-lence and simply wants the money, shoddy design becomes easier, especially if the client will not notice. Dishonesty for the sake of external goods corrupts the practice both in terms of social reputation and in terms of what is passed down in the practice to those entering it. If vice comes to dominate the practice, the practice may be unable to function in society in any organized way. But this is equally true of bricklaying. When the bricklayer no longer cares about excellence, workmanship declines and the skill's tradition suffers. The reputation of bricklayers is corrupted as is the practice itself in the eyes of current and future practitioners. Apprentices learn that money is all that counts and, if you can get away with cheap or shoddy work, do it. This phenomenon is equally true of the research chemist trying to get a weak grant proposal past government bureaucrats for the sake of the money and passing this trick down to grad students, or the CEO who bilks the public for personal gain and ruins the business. Without the intellectual bias of traditional virtue theory the corrupting effect of vice can be seen as a seamless web from complex practices down to children who cannot play tic-tac-toe any more because too many people cheat. Is there anything which by its nature could not be a practice? Here are some candidates: 1) the assembly line worker who punches the same button all day 2) belching 3) the pupil of the eye widening in dim light. I would argue that only the last one would qualify. What are the internal goods of belching? None if the act is unintentional (unless internal is taken literally!). However, in some societies (I am told) a good belch indicates a sign of approval for an excellent meal. It is intentional and voluntary to a degree. The belch could be done well or poorly and, if done well, could be an important expression of kindness and gratitude. One could obtain a sense of psychological (as well as physical) satisfaction for expressing genuine respect and doing it well. A vice like dishonesty could corrupt the practice to the point where the belch was no longer taken as genuine and that particular tradition of respect and gratitude in the society would suffer accordingly. The individual whose telos was to be a good citizen or neighbour could no longer use this particular practice.
The assembly line worker under economic duress or who is simply bored may well perform the action mindlessly. However, the worker's perspective on the work performed is critical. It may selfconsciously be part of a larger project of trying to keep self and family alive. In that case external goods are paramount. Virtues may be functional but are not absolutely necessary. Or the work could be part of a scheme to manoeuvre one's way into a better position in the company. Virtues like hard work and honesty are not intrinsi-cally necessary again though they are almost certainly useful. But the individual may actually enjoy the work in itself. The person has no greater aspirations in life, sees the necessary persistence of the work as a challenge, and is proud of his part in the manufacturing process. Virtues like honesty and loyalty are necessary to achieve the internal goods. The individual sees the work as part of a traditionhis own (perhaps his family's) and that of the company-and the work is important to his own life narrative. This scenario involving an extremely low level of skill is difficult to comprehend as a practice. But the point is that nothing precludes assembly line work (or belching) from being a practice in its own right. Virtue is a function of how the activity fits into the intentional structure of the person's life.
Aristotle was correct. Skills and virtues are different but the difference is asymmetrical. They are different kinds of human excellences, not differences in the excellence of human lifestyles. The conflation of the skill-virtue distinction with distinctions of lifestyle stems from the Greek view of the psyche and the aristocratic (not to mention sexist) Athenian tradition, and this confusion has plagued the history of virtue ethics. Its latest reincarnation, separating genuine practices from technical skills, only reinforces Aristotle's original category confusion. Virtue really does have to do with human excellence but virtue ethics needs to include all human intentional projects rather than projects defined by sex, social class, or educational level.
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